A New Legal Framework on Deprivation of Liberty
On 2 June 2026, the UK Supreme Court revised its landmark 2014 ruling in P v Cheshire West and Chester Council (‘Cheshire West’), a decision that has shaped the rights of disabled people and the duties of social care providers and public authorities for more than a decade.
The Court now rejects the long-standing ‘acid test’ for deciding whether a person is deprived of their liberty and replaced it with a broader, multi-factorial assessment. This approach considers the person’s lived experience, wishes and feelings, the level of control exercised over them, and whether coercion is present.
The judgment is likely to significantly reduce the number of people who are legally considered deprived of their liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). At the same time, it is expected to create considerable short-term uncertainty as existing arrangements are reviewed and new guidance is developed.
Many public bodies have welcomed the ruling as a correction to an overly broad approach, while disability rights organisations, charities and advocates have warned that it may weaken independent safeguards and oversight.
The decision also comes at a time of wider reform in mental health and social care law, with important implications for how community-based support is designed and delivered.
The new rule explained: the ‘acid test’ replaced by a multi-factorial assessment
Since 2014, the Cheshire West judgment established a clear legal test – the ‘acid test’, where a person was considered deprived of their libe
This approach widened the definition of deprivation of liberty and greatly expanded the number of people covered by deprivation of liberty safeguards (DoLS). In England, DoLS applications grew from about 13,000 in 2013-14 to more than 130,000 the following year. By 2024-25, annual applications had reached almost 365,000, with local authorities carrying a backlog of around 119,000 unresolved cases.
For providers in regulated settings, such as care homes and hospitals, this often tiggered a duty to seek DoLS authorisation for restrictive care arrangements. That position may now change as the threshold becomes more limited and fact specific.
However, the Supreme Court found that the acid test had produced an overly broad interpretation of deprivation of liberty that was inconsistent with European human rights case law. It held that
no single test can determine whether a person is deprived of their liberty and that each case requires a holistic assessment of the individual’s circumstances.
The new approach requires consideration of several factors, including:
- the person’s lived experience;
- their wishes, feelings and preferences;
- whether they object to the arrangements;
- the extent and purpose of any restrictions;
- the presence or absence of coercion; and
- how far the setting is normal for a person with similar needs and circumstances.
The Court also held that a person may lack capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 but still be able to give valid consent for Article 5 purposes through their wishes, feelings and acceptance of their situation.
This marks a significant legal shift and changes how deprivation of liberty assessments will be carried out across health and social care. While it might reduce DoLS referrals by narrowing the circumstances in which a deprivation of liberty is found, local authorities are likely to face an increased number of existing authorisations that will need to be reconsidered – mainly in Part 8 review requests.
Implications and concerns
The consequences of the Supreme Court 2026 extend beyond legal processes and will directly affect thousands of disabled people, autistic people, people with learning disabilities, older people and those with complex support needs.
The decision has generated strong and often contrasting responses from across the health, social care and disability sectors.
The Association of Directors of Adult Social Services (ADASS) welcomed the judgment and expressed optimism that it would reduce administrative burdens and allow resources to be directed towards frontline support rather than legal processes.
For many professionals, the judgment may result in greater recognition of personal autonomy and decision-making. The Court placed, in fact, significant emphasis on respecting the wishes and feelings of people who may lack formal decision-making capacity but are able to express acceptance of their living arrangements. This may strengthen person-centred practice and recognition of dignity where support arrangements are accepted and non-coercive.
For them, the history of social care and institutional practice demonstrates why independent scrutiny matters. Numerous safeguarding reviews and inquiries have highlighted situations in which restrictive practices became normalised over time, particularly where people had limited opportunities to express concerns or challenge decisions.
Families and self-advocates have frequently reported that restrictions are often introduced gradually and can become accepted as routine despite having a significant impact on quality of life, independence and personal freedom.
However, concerns remain regarding people with profound disabilities, communication difficulties or highly restrictive care arrangements. This is particularly significant for people whose distress is expressed indirectly, whose communication is non-verbal, whose apparent compliance may mask fear or learned helplessness, or whose restrictive arrangements have become normalised over time.
Mencap, Mind and the National Autistic Society called the judgment ‘the biggest rollback of disability rights in a generation’. They said the Cheshire West framework provided key safeguards, including independent scrutiny, advocacy, legal challenge, reviews of restrictive practice and legal aid. They warned that narrowing the definition of deprivation of liberty could reduce oversight and leave restrictive practice, abuse or neglect unchallenged.
It might also imply that many individuals who would previously have been recognised as deprived of their liberty may no longer meet the revised legal threshold despite remaining subject to continuous supervision, restrictive routines or limitations on choice. This means that fewer people qualify for the procedural safeguards that flowed automatically from a deprivation of liberty authorisation.
For people in mental health, dementia, autism, learning disability or acquired brain injury services, there is a real risk that reduced legal oversight could make it harder to identify coercion, challenge restrictive practice, or access advocacy and independent review.
The consequences following this judgment are, therefore, not simply legal; they are about ensuring that human rights, dignity and meaningful choice remain central to care and support arrangements even where formal deprivation of liberty authorisations are no longer required.
SJOG’s response
SJOG’s mission and values place human rights, dignity, inclusion and person-centred support at the heart of our practice.
While acknowledging the authority of the Supreme Court’s judgment, we remain concerned about its implications for safeguards for disabled people and others who rely on care and support services.
As stated by Dr Lisa Alcorn, Chief Operating Officer at SJOG:
“The Supreme Court’s decision to overturn the 2014 Cheshire West ruling represents a profound and deeply concerning shift in the legal protections afforded to disabled people who rely on health and social care services. A narrower legal definition of deprivation of liberty must not result in a reduction in ethical safeguards or human rights protections.”
The legal threshold may have changed, but our commitment to dignity, accountability and human rights has not.
We will continue to:
Place the voices, wishes and experiences of people we support at the centre of decision-making;
- Apply Mental Capacity Act practice consistently and robustly;
- Promote least restrictive approaches;
- Maintain robust safeguarding arrangements;
- Champion rights-based and person-centred support.
As health and social care systems adapt to both this judgment and wider Mental Health Act reforms, the focus must remain on developing specialist, community-based services capable of supporting people with complex needs safely, effectively and with dignity.
Recommendations
SJOG remains committed to ensuring that these changes promote opportunities, independence and quality of life for the people we support, while continuing to advocate for the protections and safeguards that vulnerable people deserve.
As the ruling does and should not reduce the need for strong safeguards, high-quality support and robust protection of human rights, we recommend:
- Urgent interim national guidance to support providers, local authorities and healthcare organisations during the transition period.
- New legislation and policy guidance should consider alternative safeguards procedures and ensure that individuals continue to have clear routes to advocacy, review and challenge where rights concerns arise.
- Investment to build the specialist community infrastructure necessary to support people leaving hospitals and prevent future admissions. This should include housing, behavioural support, crisis services, specialist therapies and workforce development.
Finally, all organisations involved in supporting autistic people, people with learning disabilities and others with complex needs should continue to prioritise human rights, dignity, autonomy and least restrictive practice regardless of changes to legal definitions.
June 2026